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I was honored to be invited to the Ohio State Journal on Dispute
Resolution's 2012 symposium entitled "The Role of ADR Mechanisms in
Public Sector Labor Dispute: What is at Stake, Where We can Improve &
How We can Learn from the Private Sector" and subsequently to the 2012
Annual Public Sector Labor Relations Conference of the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission (WERC) to speak on the subject of recent
developments in Wisconsin public sector labor law. The following blends my
remarks at those meetings. It is mainly an eye-witness report. I was a
member of the WERC staff from 1965 to 1973 and, by appointment of the
Governor, a member of the Commission from 1973 to 1976; and I have
maintained a labor mediation and arbitration practice in Wisconsin since
leaving that agency. Most of the observations and impressions below are
based upon my participation in the events and developments to which I refer.
Others that occurred before my time are mainly based on my conversations
with participants who were themselves participants and witnesses.
I. INTRODUCTION
During 2011, Wisconsin's newly elected Governor Scott Walker signed
two bills which, in effect, prohibited collective bargaining on behalf of most
state and local government employees in Wisconsin, with the exception of
certain protective services, emergency medical, and municipal public
transportation workers. The story of that enactment is a complicated one,
requiring speculation regarding underlying political strategies, that will
continue to receive considerable attention elsewhere. Such analysis is not the
purpose of this article. Rather, I would examine the history 37of public sector
unionism and labor law in Wisconsin and contend that a material and ironic
factor supporting the passage of those bills was the chronically controversial
nature of the nation's oldest public sector labor law, and that impasse
resolution provisions were the main source of that instability.
* The author is a mediator and arbitrator located in Madison, Wisconsin. His
practice has concentrated on public policy, environmental, and labor disputes. He wishes
to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Wisconsin mediator and arbitrator Danielle
Came in the preparation of this article.
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My suggestion, grounded on that analysis, is that a law based less on
private sector labor law and more on dispute resolution processes applied in
public policy making negotiations should be considered.
II. HISTORY: BEFORE MY TIME
Collective bargaining by unions of public employees began in Wisconsin
long before the passage of any supportive laws, apparently in the mid-1930s.
I have seen labor contracts covering public works workers in rural counties
from that era. I imagine that snow removal was an empowering capacity. The
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)
was founded there in 1936, and AFSCME Local One is still active in
Madison.1 The Madison Board of Education was responding respectfully to
organized teachers, and the Legislature paid attention to the Wisconsin State
Employees Union, on the basis of political pragmatism. Where contracts
were not entered into, employer personnel policies reflected the need for
productive workers and supportive constituents.
While there were some high profile battles with unions in the Wisconsin
private sector during the decades preceding the passage of the nation's first
public sector labor law in Wisconsin in 1959, it was not an era of public
employee strikes. The pressure that brought forth that unprecedented law was
generated by political activism, and not the perception that it was required to
restore order. A sympathetic Legislature and Governor, Gaylord Nelson,
were elected. They enacted a very brief statute, 2 essentially replicating
Section 7,3 the basic employee rights provision of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), which covered private sector collective bargaining on
the national level. It included no provisions for representation procedures,
unfair labor practices, or agency administration, and no right to strike.4 The
rhetoric of the unions at the time included complaints of second-class
citizenship compared to their private sector counterparts, and this what they
achieved initially.
Historians suggest that withholding the right to strike, even from unions
apparently not inclined to strike, and even by political leaders strongly
supportive of unionism in the public sector, may have been attributable to the
traumatic effect on the nation of the Boston police strike of 1919. Accounts
indicate that it was broadly perceived with a sense akin to terror and that it
I AFSCME, An AFSCME History Timeline (2012), http://75.afscme.org/history.
2 Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (1960).
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
4 Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (1960).
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left scars that remained for decades, influencing political leaders of all
persuasions to reject the possibility of legal strikes by public workers (It
seems to have propelled Calvin Coolidge, who was the Governor of
Massachusetts during the strike, to the Presidency; a point that may have
been observed by Ronald Reagan at the time of the flight controllers
(PATCO) strike, or by Governor Walker for that matter).
III. RECENT HISTORY: As I OBSERVED IT
The Wisconsin law was substantially amended in 1961, adding
representation procedures and prohibited practices and administration by the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.5 However, the right to strike, and
thus the threat of a strike that drives collective bargaining in the private
sector, was still not provided. 6 Maybe this was attributable in part to the
events of 1919 in Boston. Probably, there was bipartisan concern that the
combination of such empowerment and political activism promised an
undesirable political domination by the unions. In any case, mediation and
fact-finding were provided as substitutes for the right to strike, although the
law as amended generally adhered to the NLRA model.
The fact-finding procedure, briefly, was a sort of advisory interest
arbitration. Public employers and unions that were found to be at impasse,
usually following a failed mediation effort, submitted positions on
unresolved issues to a neutral third-party fact-finder, probably someone
practicing labor arbitration. The fact-finder, following a hearing, issued an
advisory opinion as to how such issues should be resolved.
This process appeared to be successful for a few years. At first, there
were very few strikes. But it lacked the capacity to impel closure that is
inherent in the threat of a strike, and its underlying theory was ambiguous.
Was the fact-finder's responsibility to advise the parties how they should
settle the outstanding issues, or how they would settle were they to adhere to
the settlement patterns of their peers, or was it to provide a new text from
which they might negotiate toward settlement? Mainly, the parties settled
their negotiations bilaterally or with the assistance of mediators, and
Wisconsin began to experience a greater frequency of public sector strikes.
There were never as many strikes in Wisconsin as in some other states
that had, by this time, enacted more-or-less similar laws. But there were
some, and I would say that the threat of an illegal strike replaced statutory
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discussed that threat with the parties, instead of the possibility of fact-
finding, and the state courts, for reasons of their own, often rather than acting
on the illegality of strikes, ordered the parties to mediation, sometimes
performed by the judge. Indeed, far more often than otherwise, the
contemplation by the parties of such a strike brought about closure in the
negotiations. That is how it worked in the private sector as well, so in a
peculiar way the public sector unions seemed to achieve the parity that their
rhetoric had demanded.
Ramifications of this achievement were demonstrated when unions
suffered some substantial losses as the result of actually going on strike.
Firefighters' unions learned that cities could not possibly close down the fire
service during a strike and that the unions would be viewed as responsible for
placing the substitutes, not to mention the general community, in serious
danger. In 1974 the small Hortonville School District replaced striking
teachers, and neither massive political efforts or legal strategies could save
their jobs or their local union.
It was first the Firefighters' Union and then the Wisconsin Education
Association Council that led the advocacy in the Wisconsin Legislature for
interest arbitration to be the next method of impasse resolution. But
municipal employers were not so sure, and neither were some larger local
teachers' unions that believed that gaining the right to strike was still their
best strategy.
The last-best-offer all-disputed-items-as-a-package type interest
arbitration that was eventually adopted, first for the protective services in
1971, and then for other local government bargaining units inl977,7 clearly
functioned as a strike substitute. Strikes virtually disappeared from the state
and the threat of arbitration seemed to precipitate settlements at about the
same rate as the threat of strikes in the private sector. Nevertheless, I have
always found interest arbitration to be problematic.
First of all, interest arbitration turns enormous political power-the
power to set the labor costs of a unit of government-over to an unelected
individual: the arbitrator. Such authority is inherently controversial as a
matter of political theory, and inevitably uncomfortable as a matter to be
explained to the general public. As such an arbitrator, I know the limits of
my accountability, as well the limits of my competence. The determinations
typically made by labor arbitrators interpreting collective bargaining
agreements are as different from those made in interest arbitration as
legislation is from enforcement. Whatever the rationale for interest
arbitration and however unable we are to come up with a better strategy, it
7 See Wis. STAT. § 111.10 (2010).
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seems destined by its nature to remain controversial as an element of public
policy.
As a matter of union policy, it raises other issues. As noted above, it
created something of a rift between components of the Wisconsin labor
movement that believed that they would achieve more without interest
arbitration, notably large teachers' union locals, and organizations that were
less confident of bargaining power on the bargaining unit level. More
importantly, in my view, it elevated the role of the statewide labor
organizations that were positioned to influence the provisions of the interest
arbitration law relative to the role of the local bargaining units. This
redistribution of power within the union structure was reinforced by the need
to gather data and present it well that is essential to success in interest
arbitration and was obviously mainly a statewide function. With interest
arbitration, the need for organizing and solidarity in order to accomplish
workplace improvements was subordinated to the need for data management
and presentation skills provided by experts. In that sense it seemed quite
conflicted with orthodox concepts of strength based on local concerted
efforts and shared risk taking that have characterized American unionism.
Moreover, the emphasis on politics in the Capitol that seems inherent in
interest arbitration places the collective bargaining regime squarely in the
state's political environment. That brings me back to the controversial nature
of interest arbitration. A cursory review of forty years of interest arbitration
in Wisconsin reveals the passage and repeal of numerous significant features
of interest arbitration. Examples included the enactment and repeal of a
provision for mediation by the arbitrator, a number of revisions of the
subjects of bargaining covered by that process, the imposition and repeal of a
complicated formula referred to as "Qualified Economic Offer" intended to
reduce the potential impact of arbitration on government budgets,8 and a
number of revisions of the statutory "factors" that served as criteria for
selecting a final offer. A provision that allowed strikes by non-police and fire
employees where that was agreed to in a labor agreement, or both parties
withdrew their final offers in arbitration, was never utilized. The process
remained in a state of flux. Revisions reflected the preferences of the political
party in power. As Wisconsin politics grew more polarized along with those
of the nation in general the revisions were correspondingly substantial.
During the session of the Wisconsin Legislature preceding Governor
Walker's election, Democratic Party majorities passed and the Democratic
8 See Qualified Economic Offer, Budget Briefs from the Wisconsin Legislative
Reference Bureau, Budget Brief 98-5 (June 1998),
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/budbriefs/98bb5.pdf.
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Governor, James Doyle, signed, numerous revisions to public sector labor
laws sought by unions, including amendments adding coverage of the
University of Wisconsin System and repealing the aforementioned QEO
provision.9 When it became the turn of the new Republican majorities and
Governor, they reciprocated, and then some. Public sector collective
bargaining law, and particularly its impasse resolution features, never came
to rest and now that the process was to be determined, not by strengths or
weaknesses at the bargaining table level, but at the Capitol, it was a
vulnerable pawn in the larger game of party politics.
IV. THE FuTuRE
My contention is that if there is to be a revival of public sector collective
bargaining in Wisconsin it needs to look forward, beyond the private sector
law, for a model and to identify an impasse resolution process that is more
cognizant of public perceptions and public interests, and thus less
controversial. At the same time, I would suggest returning to the venerable
wisdom of emphasis on the capacity of bargaining unit members to develop
bargaining power by acting in concert.
It is difficult for me to believe that where power exists, even without the
support of the law, as it was prior to 1959 in Wisconsin, it will not function.
Whether it is the ability to interfere with the efficiency and effectiveness of
operations, like the snowplow operators of the 1930's, or the capacity to
influence voters and elected officials, like the Madison teachers of the
1950's, it will be expressed in one way or another, and accommodated. That
is a lesson of American history. That sort of power causes laws to be enacted;
it is not derived from law.
Unless I am mistaken, there will be negotiations of some sort, in some
places, over wages, hours and working conditions, and perhaps more
broadly, which will benefit from assistance. We should be thinking creatively
and imagining processes that learn from the past and do not attempt to
replicate the private sector; the focus should be on looking for models that do
not alarm the public or appear undemocratic. Let's consider negotiations that
incorporate public involvement as may be found in other dispute resolution
sectors. It seems essential to recognize that public sector labor negotiations
are not transactions among private entities, but are processes that develop
public policy. They influence the costs and efficacy of governmental
institutions and programs.
9 See Act of Jun, 8, 2009, 2009 Wis. Act 21; Act of Jun. 29, 2009 Wis. Act 28; Act
of Jul. 20, 2009 Wis. Act 34.
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While the labor law developments to which I have referred were
underway, a remarkable evolutionary process was also occurring in
American dispute resolution-a development rooted in our labor relations
tradition. Mediation was proliferating at an extraordinary rate throughout the
legal system and in the development of public policies ranging from land use
and urban planning to the promulgation of administrative rules, to the
protection of the environment and beyond. Mediation, which mitigated the
deficits of fact-finding, illegal strikes, and interest arbitration in Wisconsin,
maintained its reputation for integrity and effectiveness, flourished, and
acquired respect beyond its historic arenas.
Contemporary American dispute resolution, broadly defined, includes
strategies for managing negotiations so as to incorporate public participation
and engender public support for negotiated outcomes. Generally, mediation
is a key element of those strategies. Of course, it may not be all that is
needed. Mediation generally requires the existence of a worrisome next step,
such as a trial or a strike or a vote. It usually functions as a method for
avoiding the consequences of failing to agree. For the time being, and given
current circumstances, however, I would urge emphasis on innovative
mediation practices in public sector employment relations. At least in
Wisconsin, thinking even further ahead seems premature.
V. POST SCRIPT
On September 14, 2012, not long after the submission of this piece to the
Journal's editors, a Wisconsin Circuit Court determined that major portions
of the recently passed collective bargaining law were in violation of the State
and Federal Constitutions. That decision nullified the law's prohibitions on
bargaining, but did not restore the interest arbitration provisions of the
previous statute. 10 Almost immediately, Dane County, the City of Madison
and The Madison Metropolitan School District initiated negotiations for
extensions of their present labor agreements with unions representing their
employees. The bargaining was rushed because motions to stay the Circuit
Court's ruling pending appeals were filed. However, agreements were
achieved, albeit with some hard swallowing on the part of the unions. On the
other hand, the vast majority of local government employers apparently
presumed that the stay would be obtained and continued on the course set
before the Madison Teachers, Inc. et al v. Scott Walker et al. decision.
10 Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker., No. 11CV 3774, 2012 WL 4041495, at *27
(Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept. 14, 2012).
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This very recent history seems relevant as evidence that, at least where
local government leaders believe that organized employees should not be
ignored, they will engage in earnest bargaining, as long as it does not violate
the law. It seems to demonstrate how practical politics empower unions of
local government employees and may even do so in the presence of statutory
inhibitors and the absence of statutory impasse resolution procedures.
44
[Vol. 28:1 2013]
